WWI


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Rude Awakenings: WWI and the 20th Century**
 * The Great War**

Terms to know: system of alliances nationalism Classical Liberalism Duma Balkan wars Serbia Bulgaria Bosnia and Herzegovina Gavrilo Princip Society of the Black Hand Archduke Franz Ferdinand the blank check Schlieffen Plan First Battle of the Marne machine guns trenches race to the sea Erich von Falkenhayn Verdun battle of attrition

Discussion Question: Identify at least three causes of the First World War, and show how they led to the conflict.

The First World War was really the first act of the 20th century. As such, it created the world that we live in. The battles, the carnage, the weapons and their mass-produced nature, the economics of total war, and the need for every sector of society to participate in order just to survive set the tone for the world in the 20th century. The senselessness of the war – its unlikely trigger, and the nationalistic chain reaction it set in motion, as well as the almost silly rivalries and guarantees that were its more direct, if not immediate, cause – led to a sea change in human history that has not yet clearly ended. The technological nature of the war contributed to a new ambivalence toward science, and a distrust of the human ability to manage technology that is still with us. The need for total economic commitment to the war led to the creation of economies and governments that had more control over their people than ever before in history. The lack of reason and the terrible human cost of the war led people to ask whether humans were, in fact, rational at all, and to suspect that we have a self-destructive streak. This absolute loss of confidence in the values, and the efforts, that had driven the 19th century was not limited to the West, but spread worldwide. It made clear the vulnerability of the Western imperial powers, and encouraged conquered peoples to seek their freedom, often through the use of Western concepts and systems. In short, the First World War led people world wide to begin to doubt the process of "progress" and "civilization" that had been led by Western science, technology, and political philosophy over the past 300 years. The key problem was that people were unable to find universally applicable concepts to take the place of those discredited. They thus turned to local solutions such as nationalism, militarism, fascism and totalitarianism. These new ideas appeared to be modern solutions to modern problems in an age of cynical belief in the lack of a universal truth. Society changed forever after the First World War, and the means by which it was waged set the pattern for the changes it would engender.

The First World War was set in motion far earlier than 1914. Its causes are multiple and complex. None of the causes adequately explain what the war was about, simply why it occurred. In other words, every reason given for the beginning of the war is really a proximate cause, and not one that can offer us deeper meaning for the great loss of life that occurred. This leads us to the cynical conclusion, unfortunate as it is, that the war was fought for no other reason than that its participants were not farsighted enough to see a way out of it. Taken to its logical conclusion, this led to the idea that humans are a bloodthirsty race driven to seek our own doom – a thought widely shared by Europeans and non-Europeans alike following the war’s end.

First among the causes of the war was a set of what George Washington would have called "entangling alliances" on the European continent at the end of the 19th century. That **system of alliances** was complicated by an intense competition among the great powers (only two of which by 1905 were not European countries) for economic strength, military dominance, and colonial possessions. These facts were complicated by surging nationalism that had led to the unification of both Italy and Germany, and the liberation of Romania, Serbia, Albania, Greece, and Macedonia from the Ottoman Empire, not to mention causing the American Civil War. Russian unilateralism and sword rattling was no less responsible for the tensions found in Europe during the prewar years. Russia, while participating in the European balance of power on its western borders, refused to recognize European concerns over its expansion in the areas of the Ottoman Empire and Central Asia during the first several years of the 20th century. German overconfidence led to a pushiness which its growing military power made threatening to the powers in Europe that shared its borders. The more Germany asserted its power and prepared for a multi-front war, the more other European powers felt it necessary to join together for protection against it. Further souring the mixture was a successful middle class whose liberal ambitions to become part of the government of each European country had complicated the governing strategies of all, and compromised some beyond repair. Nationalism, liberalism, and the attendant shifts in social and economic power had been difficult for nearly every European power to deal with administratively, and philosophically. These internal tensions were so great that the years prior to WWI were filled with a hope that a general war might force societies into cooperation internally, finally healing the wounds of the political turmoil of the 19th century. The success of the middle class, of course, also guaranteed the existence of another, more restive class: the workers. The necessity of these two groups in the enterprise of industrial production would make them absolutely critical in the First World War. Both groups were much larger than the traditional aristocracy that had owned European governments prior to 1789, and this combined with their direct control of industrial production to make them the pillars of most European societies by the early years of the 20th century. This war was to be an industrial war, and the laborers and factory owners thus needed to made to believe in the war in order to secure their cooperation in producing its materiel, and to provide the human element of each nation's war machine.

Thus the tensions in Europe were real, and profound. However, it was not clear either before or after the Great War that international conflict would, in fact, go any way toward addressing these problems, let alone solving them. In the end, the failure both of the war and the peace that followed it were the direct catalysts of the still more violent "Second World War" of the 1930’s and 40’s.

The entangling **alliances** mentioned above were the result, at least in part, of the Crimean War of the mid-19th century. Though it was a localized war, and its brutality was eventually ended by diplomacy, not military victory for either side, the Crimean War had one overwhelming legacy: it had destabilized the Concert of Europe. After the Treaty of Vienna in 1815-16, England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, had pledged to work together to maintain peace and, most importantly, the balance of power in Europe. The Crimean War, however, pitted England and France against Russia, with Austria and Prussia looking on from the sidelines. With two Concert powers fighting each other, and no intervention by the other two Concert powers – the foreign policies of the big four that had defeated Napoleon diverged so greatly that it was difficult to see how they could cooperate to keep the peace. Indeed, it appeared now that the Concert powers were the ones most likely to becom belligerents. Russia, in fact, was unwilling to even consider the idea that its activities in the Crimea would come under the purview of the Concert, or that any powers besides itself and the Ottoman Empire should be concerned with this area of the world. So by the late 19th century, the balance of power in Europe was already undefended, and thus subject to revision.

That revision was already underway by 1861 as Italy, then Prussia, began the moves toward unification discussed earlier in the course, both using **nationalism** as a unifying force for otherwise rather disparate peoples. Even the United States got into the act in 1861, as it began moving toward Civil War over the rights of one section of the country to secede from the Union on the basis of what were called irreconcilable cultural, linguistic, and economic differences - nationalism.

Unified, Italy and Germany created geopolitical realities that were completely different from the situation created by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Both incorporated several of the buffer countries that had been created as kingdoms to act as bulwarks against possible French aggression. Both had new, larger populations which created greater tax bases and larger recruitment pools, thus large military potential that had not existed before in the service of Italian or German nationalism. The balance of power was, then, fairly upset by nationalism in practice in Europe. In fact, it can also be argued that the military potential of the United States was greatly increased because of the experience it had gained during its own nationalist Civil War. (The United States, however, had quickly de-mobilized its Civil War armies, and the U.S. military was ranked only 17th in the world by 1914).
 * Classical Liberalism** (what most Americans call "conservatism") was also one of the major forces that would upset the apple cart in 1914. Throughout the 1800’s, again as discussed earlier in the course, the growing, and increasingly wealthy, middle class continued to push for a greater role in government, and was increasingly successful, especially in the late 19th and early 20th century. While France went through several revolutions in the 19th century, it never gave up its national assembly. The primary question that each revolution attempted to answer was, in fact, who should be able to sit in, and to elect, the national assembly, and how much power should that assembly have.

The creation of the German Empire on Bismark’s watch saw the expansion of the Prussian elective assembly into a bi-cameral house including an upper house of aristocratic Junker members, and a lower house of elected commoners – mostly middle class. Following the attempted assassination of Russia Czar Nicholas II, and the revolution of 1905 in Russia, the **Duma**, an elective body, was established (though its role was only advisory, and various czars listened or did not according to personal preference). While these representative bodies were often limited in their ability to shape national and international policy, they certainly provided a voice for the middle class, and for nationalist and middle class values that were often at odds with the needs of the Congress of Vienna’s agreements and borders.

These elements came to the fore explosively during the **Balkan wars** of the early 20th century. These were initially a series of wars of independence by Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Romania, Greece, and Bulgaria against the Ottoman Empire. By 1878 a Russian expedition, ostensibly to help their Slavic and Orthodox Christian "little brothers" escape the domination of the Turks, but actually a continuation of Russia’s territorial expansion, had freed these countries officially. Following nationalist lines of thought, several of these new nations, notably **Serbia** and **Bulgaria**, attempted to expand their borders to include all people of Serbian or Bulgarian descent. These expansions were usually carried out at the expense of other new slavic states in the region. Austria and Russia also remained interested in gaining territory in the Balkans.

In 1908, by secret agreement, Austria annexed **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, and Russia was to annex the Dardanelles. As the secret negotiations had been initiated by Russia, other Slavic nations in the Balkans were angry when Austria took control of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia was also angry with Austria, since Austria’s quick occupation of its portion of the Balkans did not allow time for Russia to occupy the Dardanelles, and Russia’s claim was thus not ratified by the international community, while Austria’s was. This set the scene for tensions that would erupt in 1914. Russia needed both to pay Austria back for its treachery, and get back into good graces with the other Slavic states that it had betrayed.

In 1912, the Balkan states in alliance pushed Turkey out of continental Europe. By 1913, however, they had begun fighting amongst themselves for the spoils of that victory. This internal Balkan warfare led to a further delineation of "national characteristics," and an increase in nationalism in the region. This upsurge of Balkan nationalism led, in 1914, directly to the shot(s) that started the first world war. A Serbian nationalist, 19-year-old **Gavrilo Princip**, member of the **Society of the Black Hand**, a terrorist group that promoted Serbian nationalist expansion, executed the heir to the Austrian throne, **Archduke Franz Ferdinand**. Though Princip was later caught, and the Serbian government was not shown to have any direct ties to the Black Hand, Austria demanded an apology and indemnities from Serbia. Serbia was willing to meet most of Austria’s demands, but not all, and that, according to Austria, was grounds for war. An invasion was planned, and Germany was asked to back up Austria’s actions. Austria declared war on Serbia on July 27,1914.

Austria’s primary reason for this draconian action was concern, as a multi-ethnic state, that Serbian nationalist success here would demonstrate to Austria’s other nationalities that they could agitate for national independence with impunity. So, though Serbia was an autonomous nation outside Austrian jurisdiction, it was decided to punish all Serbs to prevent nationalist agitation within the Austrian empire. Germany concurred with this reasoning, and was also supportive since Austria was Germany’s only dependable ally. Thus Germany gave Austria a "**blank check**" to do whatever it saw fit in Serbia, with assurances that Germany would assist should other powers join the fight against Austria.

Russia, attempting to demonstrate goodwill toward its Slavic "little brothers" in the Balkans, chose this moment to refuse to back down in its support of Serbia, and so when Austria mobilized, the Russians also mobilized on July 30, 1914.

Russian mobilization was encouraged by the French, who were in the process of beginning their own mobilization. The French repeatedly queried the Russians as to their ability to meet the French mobilization timetable according to treaties they had signed with Russia.

In the meantime, Germany had begun implementing its **Schlieffen Plan**. The plan was concocted in order to deal with two enemies at the same time. Those two enemies were assumed most likely to be Russia and France. France because it had been the loser in the German war of unification in 1872, and had been on the short end of German sabre-rattling diplomacy since the retirement of Otto von Bismark. Russia because, and erstwhile ally of Germany, it had been brushed aside by Kaiser William II in his brash, emotionally driven foreign policy.

Although the Shlieffen Plan was unique in its determination to fight two enemies at once (probably also its greatest failing), in many other respects it looked strikingly like the mobilization plans for the other great powers of Europe. It was heavily dependent upon the new industrial and rail technology to equip and transport soldiers to the front as soon as possible. Indeed, all of the belligerents found that once they began implementing their mobilization plans, changes were close to impossible. Rail schedules had to be met, or massive passenger trains full of soldiers might meet equally heavily loaded munitions trains at unfortunate crossings, causing accidents and loss of life and equipment. It was assumed then, that once a mobilization plan was implemented, it could not be changed or reversed - it was a crossing of the rubicon. Trains were to bring soldiers to, or near, the front lines as quickly as possible, thus hopefully achieving the element of surprise, and overwhelming the enemy's defenses before reinforcements could arrive through the enemy's rail system. Once there, new, high technology weapons were expected to be used in an unrelenting march to the objective.

While Germany was not the sole instigator of the war, German territorial ambitions cannot be left out of the equation. It is clear that the Kaiser felt he had something to prove, both to the world, and especially to his royal cousins in England and Russia. It is also clear that a number of efforts were made to stop the war as it was beginning. These efforts, however, were either mistaken, or were quickly sabotaged by assumptions of the day. For example, at one point, Kaiser William II got cold feet, and asked the commander of the general staff in 1914, General von Moltke, if there was any way to delay or change the mobilization schedule. Moltke said there was none, and any attempt to do so would prove disastrous. It appears, however, that delays, reversals, or even a modification of the plan to send troops to defend only the East would have been possible and not disastrous. It was never tried.

The objective under the Schlieffen Plan was, as General Schlieffen himself put it, to have the sleeve of the farthest right shoulder brush the English Channel on his way by, while the left wing of the German army gave way under French assault to form a sort of pocket in which to catch the French army, and surround it with the wheeling right flank of the German army. This repeat of the 1871 victory of Germany over France at the Battle of Sedan, was no great surprise. The surprise came when it failed.

Finding itself slipping farther and farther behind the time schedule (the Plan called for Germany to take France in 6 weeks, then re-train and return to the Eastern border of East Prussia to begin the assault against the Russians) the general staff decided to cut the wheel maneuver short, and try to encircle what was, in fact, a losing, battle weary French Army earlier and faster than previously expected.

In August of 1914, German armies invaded Belgium on their way to France according to Schlieffen Plan doctrine. The invasion of Belgium caused France to mobilize its armies against Germany. German violation of neutral Belgian territory ( a neutrality for many years guaranteed by Great Britian) also forced Great Britain to join the war, sending several units to Belgium, and an expeditionary division to France.

At the end of August, German troops decided to wheel around toward the East before reaching Paris. This decision was based on military intelligence that told them the main French force would be caught in this net. However, French and British forces had withdrawn only hours before the Germans came in contact with their former positions. The French and English then attacked along the German exposed flank in the **First Battle of the Marne**, forcing the Germans to withdraw behind the Marne and begin building dug-out defense works.

These defense works came to be known as the Western Front in 1914. As each side set up defensive lines, it became clear that the fire of the new **machine guns** could strafe low-level positions, so deep **trenches** became a necessity of survival. Each side in 1915 tried to outflank the other in both directions. This led to what we now call the "**race to the sea**" - literally an all-out race to see who could create the defense works and restore normalcy behind them, from the Marne all the way to the English Channel in the west, and east to Switzerland. As quickly as it had begun, the war settled down into stalemate.

The stalemate quickly became a battle of attrition in the West. In 1916, newly appointed chief of the German general staff **Erich von Falkenhayn** had machine guns, rifled cannon, carbine rifles, new longer bayonets, new uniforms that were grey and made soldiers difficult to see, and poison gas. He also had telegraphs and aircraft which could give him information on the progress of battle almost immediately. And he believed he had the finest fighting men in the world. These things suggested to him a plan that he decided to carry out at Verdun, an ancient city that he knew the French would never allow to be taken. His goal was to cause the French to concentrate all of their energy at **Verdun**, where he would concentrate all of his firepower, with the goal of killing so many French soldiers that the French state would no longer be able to defend itself. This was a **battle of attrition**, in which Falkenhayn cared little about whether he took control of Verdun. His interest lay in the mass execution of as many French soldiers as possible. In the year-long battle, each side lost 500,000 men. Verdun also set the stage for the battles that followed, with massive death tolls due as much to mistaken assumptions about battle in a new, high-tech, industrial world, by commanders who were fighting the last war in their minds, not reacting well to new realities, as to the new weapons themselves.

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